We propose a new quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on the fully quantum mechanical states of Faraday rotators. The protocol is unconditionally secure against collective attacks for a multi-photon source of up to two photons on a noisy environment. It is also robust against impersonation attacks. The protocol may be implemented experimentally with the current spintronics technology on semiconductors.
Introduction
The computational algorithm powered by quantum mechanics, on the one hand, has posed a serious threat to the classical cryptosystem [1] . On the other hand, quantum cryptography allows for unconditionally secure sharing of private keys.
Ever since the pioneering works by Bennet, Brassard, and Ekert [2] [3] [4] , a great number of new quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols have been proposed to enhance the security and efficiency under nonidealistic situations and to incorporate new ideas [5] . In particular, Boström and Felbinger [6] recently proposed the so-called ping-pong protocol. The protocol is interesting in that it enables direct communication deterministically and without classical communications (except for checking eavesdropping). Although the original protocol turned out to be insecure in lossy channels [7] and against blind attacks without eavesdropping [8] , the idea still survives in a recent modified version [9] .
In the ping-pong protocol [6, 9] , Bob sends a qubit to Alice, Alice performs a unitary operation on it with a random probability p and send it back to Bob, and finally Bob performs a measurement on it. The unitary operation by Alice (if ever performed) transforms the initial state of the qubit to a state orthogonal to the initial state. This enables Bob to read Alice's message directly. Putting another way, the unitary operation is performed conditioned on the classical information (0 or 1) that Alice wants to send to Bob. A conceptually interesting question would be: 'What if we perform the unitary operation conditioned on the quantum state of another qubit?' The idea is to protect the key by encoding in the entangled state of the travel and home qubits, created by the conditional operation, since accessing only a single qubit in an entangled pair does not reveal the information. In this work, we propose a new QKD protocol implementing this idea and address the security issues of it. The protocol is explained in section 2. We will show in sections 3 and 4 that the protocol is secure against eavesdropping for an ideal single-photon source and robust against impersonation attacks. The protocol turns out to be insecure when the photon source produces more than two photons; this will be analyzed in section 5. We will discuss in section 6 possible experimental realizations of the protocol using semiconductor spintronics.
Protocol
While the protocol is independent of the physical system in use, we will have in mind the photon polarizations as travel qubits and electron spins as home qubits. The key element of our protocol is then the quantum Faraday rotation (QFR). The (classical) Faraday rotation refers to the rotation of the linear polarization direction of the light when a magnetic field is applied parallel to the propagation direction of the light. It occurs because the speeds of the right-hand and left-hand circularly polarized lights are different. In the quantum regime, the polarization directions of single photons and magnetization directions of single spins are described quantum mechanically.
In the description of the protocol, we will use the basis consisting of the eigenstates of σ z , |↑ (right-handed circular polarization) and |↓ (left-handed circular polarization). We denote by |φ the state along the azimuthal angle φ on the equator of the Poincaré (or Bloch) sphere (see figure 1 ):
The key operation in our protocol is the QFR by angle π/2 around z-axis of the Poincaré sphere
on the travel qubit C conditioned by the home qubit A. For example, operating on the product state |φ = 0 A |φ C , it gives
where |φ ± = |φ ± π/2 . In quantum information theoretic terms, the QFR in equation (2) corresponds to the conditional phase shift. Possible physical realizations of QFR will be discussed later (section 6). The protocol is as following (see figure 2 ). (1) To start the nth iteration of the protocol, Alice and Bob first prepare their home qubits A and B, respectively, in the state |φ = 0 . 3 (2) Alice then takes a travel qubit C and prepares it in the state |α . The angle α should be chosen randomly in the interval 0 α < 2π . (3) Alice performs (by interacting A and C) the QFR U A;C on C and sends it to Bob. We note that on its way to Bob, the travel qubit C is maximally entangled with A:
(not normalized). (4) Bob receives C, performs U B;C on it, and sends it back to Alice. The qubit C is again maximally entangled on its way back to Alice, now with both A and B:
(not normalized), where |ᾱ ≡ |α + π . (5) Now Bob takes his own travel qubit D and prepares it in the state |β . The angle β should be chosen randomly in the interval 0 β < 2π . (6) Bob performs the QFR U B;D on D and sends it to Alice. (7) Alice receives D, performs U A;D on it, and sends it back to Bob. The final state of all the qubits A, B, C, and D is given by a GHZ-like state A few remarks on the procedure are in order. Alice can measure S α (see step 8 above) even before the step 5. It follows from the GHZ-like structure of the state in equations (5) and (6) . Step 9 is not essential. It can be removed with a minor change in step 10.
Before analyzing the security of the protocol, we point out a few interesting features of the protocol. First, the travel qubit is always in a maximally entangled states with the home qubit(s) whenever exposed to eavesdropping. This is the essential feature of the protocol that provides the protocol with the security. Second, at the key sharing stage no classical communication is necessary. The key is shared only through the quantum channel 4 . This is also closely related to the security of the protocol. Third, two bits are generated at an iteration and they have the common security fate. If the first bit has been tampered by eavesdropping or noise in the channel, the security of the second bit is not guaranteed, either.
Security proof
Let us analyze general attacks from a third party (see figure 3 ) in the case that the photon source generates a single photon. We closely follow the lines in [9] . As usual, Eve is assumed to be an almighty eavesdropper limited only by the law of physics. The most general (assuming that Eve does not know Alice's choice of basis) operationÊ 1 Eve can do on the travel qubit C can be written aŝ
where the states | 00 , | 01 , | 11 , and | 10 of the ancilla E are normalized, but not orthogonal to each other. Without loss of generality, we can set 00 | 01 = 00 | 10 = 10 | 11 = 01 | 11 = 0 from the unitarity of E 1 [9] . The basis {|γ , |γ } for C is an arbitrary choice made by Eve. Recall that the angle α has been chosen randomly for each travel qubit C and is never announced to the public; this is one of the biggest differences of our protocol both from the BB84-type and ping-pong-type protocols.
When 00 | 11 = 01 | 10 = 1, Eve cannot distinguish between |γ C and |γ C by any measurement on her ancillae. In this case, Eve can acquire no more information than no attack is performed. Therefore, a minimal requirement for Eve's strategy is that such an operation as gives no information at all to her should not be detected by the legitimate partners (Alice and Bob). This can be achieved if Eve does not disturb travel qubits. It gives the condition, |e| = 1 and | f | = 0. In passing, we note that 00 | 11 = 0 corresponds to an interceptand-resend attack.
Having this (|e| = 1 and | f | = 0) in mind, we rewrite the attack operation on the travel qubit aŝ
and
whereα ≡ α − γ + π/2. On C's way from Bob back to Alice, Eve can perform another similar attackÊ 2 with a new ancilla F. With the same requirement as inÊ 1 , the attack operationÊ 2 takes the simple formÊ
Since our protocol is symmetric between Alice and Bob, Eve's attack operationsÊ 1 andÊ 2 on Bob's travel qubit D can be written, analogously toÊ 1 andÊ 2 , with respect to new ancillae E and F . The optimal Eve's attack will be the symmetric one such that 00 | 11 = 00 | 11 and η 00 |η 11 = η 00 |η 11 The angleβ = β − γ + π/2 relates Bob's choice {|β , |β } and Eve's choice {|γ , |γ } for the basis for D.
After all the procedures by Alice and Bob, Eve performs a collective measurement on her ancillae E, F, E , and F . From the measurement result, she extracts the information about the state of Alice's home qubit A and Bob's B; namely, the information about the results of the QFR on the travel qubits C and D. The information is eventually the information about the key values shared by Alice and Bob.
The operationsÊ 1 ,Ê 2 ,Ê 1 , andÊ 2 by Eve inevitably disturb the quantum state of the travel qubit C and D. Simply comparing the test bits (step 12 of the protocol), Alice and Bob may detect the attack. The detection probability p d depends on the angle differencesα andβ. Since the anglesα andβ are randomly distributed, the detection probability is given by
where cos x ≡ 00 | 11 = 00 | 11 and cos y ≡ η 00 |η 11 = η 00 |η 11 . The maximum value of p d is 3/8 corresponding to the intercept-and-resend attack (cos x = cos y = 0). Let us suppose that the initial state prepared by Alice and Bob is given by
After all attacks the final state is given by
with
and To this end, we first note that
and that Therefore, Eve's best policy will be first to exploit the orthogonal subspaces containing |1 E F and |4 E F , respectively, and then to distinguish the non-orthogonal states, namely |2 E F and |3 E F from |5 E F and |6 E F , within these subspaces. Further, defining the normalized overlap
(i, j = 1, . . . , 6), we have the inequalities
Namely, the states |2 E F and |3 E F can be distinguished worse from |5 E F and |6 E F than any two states with the mutual overlap of min{cos x, cos y} can be distinguished from each other. Based on this observation, we analyze the worst case, where 2|5 E F = 3|6 E F = 2|6 E F = 3|5 E F = min{cos x, cos y}. Further, it is clear that the optimal attack for Eve is the balanced one [9] , for which cos x = cos y, and hereafter we focus on the balanced case. Putting all the above observations together and with lengthy algebra, one can calculate the mutual information I (A, B) between Alice and Bob and I (A, E) ( or I (B, E) ) between Alice (or Bob) and Eve; note that because of the symmetry in our protocol, I (A, E) = I (B, E) . They are given by respectively. p d in equation (27) is the detection probability (see equation (13)) for the balanced attack (cos x = cos y), and p e in equation (28) is defined by
For a QKD to be secure, it is required that I (A, B) I (A, E) [5] . The mutual information I (A, B) and I (A, E) are plotted as functions of the detection probability p d in figure 4 . The maximum information between Alice and Eve occurs at p d = 0.345, which is less than the maximum detection probability ( p d = 3/8) corresponding to the intercept-andresend attack. This means that the intercept-and-resend attack is not an optimal attack for Eve . I (A, B) and I (A, E) becomes equal for the detection probability p d = 0.266 188. This detection probability is greater than p d = 0.18 for the ping-pong protocol [9] and p d = 0.15 for BB84 protocol. So far the security has been analyzed for incoherent attacks. In general, Eve can attacks many qubits coherently by collecting many ancillae and performing a global measurement on them. Since our protocol shares many common features with the BB84 or similar protocols, we can first follow the lines in section VI.G of [5] to prove the security of our protocol against collective attacks [10] . An argument for the security against the most general coherent attacks [11] is given below. After Alice and Bob repeats the protocol n times to share a key of length of 2n bits, the sum of the mutual information I (A, B) and I (A, E) should be less than 2n, i.e.,
Equivalently speaking, I (A, B) + I (A, E) 1 per single qubit. This is because Eve and Bob cannot acquire more information than is sent out mutually by Alice and Bob whatever measurement is performed by Eve. Therefore, in order that I (A, B) > I (A, E) (theorem 1 in [5] ), it suffices to have I (A, B) n. Since I (A, B) 
, p d is required to be less than 0.110 028, approximately 11%, which is the upper bound for the BB84 protocol [10, 11] . This proves that our protocol is at least as secure as the BB84 protocol against collective attacks. The above lines of proof applies only for collective attacks. However, it has been argued that the collective attack may be the optimal one of the most general coherent attacks [12] . It is also interesting to note that for incoherent attacks, I (A, E) in equation (28) is significantly restricted and hence the sum I (A, B) + I (A, E) per single qubit is far less than 1; cf. (30). This is demonstrated in figure 4(b) comparing the sum for the BB84 protocol and for ours. It suggest that the upper bound p d ≈ 11% may be reduced further with proper analysis of the restriction on the possible measurements by Eve. More detailed analysis of the security of our protocol against coherent attacks should therefore be an interesting topic for further studies in the future.
Impersonation attack
In our protocol, Alice sends a qubit to Bob and gets it back. So does Bob with another travel qubit. It is possible for Eve to intercept the channel and pretend to be her/his legitimate partner to each. One can think of two different ways of impersonation attack. In the first method (see figure 5 (a)), Eve uses two home qubits of her own. Eve can use one of the two to share a perfect key with Alice following the procedures of the protocol in section 2, and the other to share another key with Bob. However, the keys so generated to Alice and Bob are independent and have no correlation. Therefore, by bit verification procedure, this attack can be detected with probability 1/2.
In the second method (see figure 5 (b)), Eve uses only one home qubit E of her own, which is used for the interaction with both Alice and Bob. In this case, the total wavefunction of the whole qubits is given by (not normalized), where the product states are arranged such as |... AB E |... C DE (E is the travel qubit of Eve's). It then follows immediately that the detection probability of this attack is still 1/2.
Photon number splitting attack
Finally, we investigate the security of the protocol against the photon number splitting attack (PNS). (We note that the security analysis in the case of lossy channel is essentially the same as that against the PNS attack.) Let us suppose that the photon source generate three photons (the discussion can be trivially generalized to the case of more photons; see below). Eve takes one photon (say E 1 ) on the quantum channel from Alice to Bob and another (E 2 ) on the channel back to Alice from Bob; see figure 6 . Therefore, Eve can know the key without being detected simply by checking whether 1 | 2 1 | 2 > 0 (Alice and Bob share the key 0) 1 | 2 1 | 2 < 0 (Alice and Bob share the key 1), where 1 , 1 = α,ᾱ and 2 , 2 = β,β. This test can be easily done, for example, using an interferometer. The discussion is trivially generalized to the case of even more photons. It is enough for Eve to steal two photons from Alice and another two from Bob. One may be tempted to overcome this problem using four home qubits (two for Alice and two for Bob) as illustrated in figure 7 . This scheme 'hides' by means of entanglement the output state of C and D even after Alice and Bob perform projective measurements on C and D. However, following similar lines as above, the total wavefunction of the whole qubits is given by 
arranging the product states such as |.
Therefore, in order to know the key, all Eve has to do is to distinguish the Bell state | ± from | ± , which is as easy as the test for the two-home-qubit scheme analyzed above.
Experimental feasibility
The parametric Faraday rotation of photon polarization by atomic spins has been widely used in quantum optics and atomic physics. For example, it has been used for quantum non-demolition measurement of the atomic spin [13] [14] [15] . However, because of the weak atom-photon interaction, the Faraday rotation angle is usually quite small (several degrees).
To enhance the atom-photon interaction and achieve a rotation angle of π/2, one can put an atom in a cavity. Unfortunately, trapping a single atom in a cavity is still technologically challenging. A more promising candidate for a conditional Faraday rotation of photon polarization is the quantum dot (so-called the artificial atom) in a micro-cavity, which has already been demonstrated experimentally [16, 17] . Here the photon interacts with the electron spin in the semiconductor quantum dot. The transmission distance (the flying distance of the travel qubits) is limited mainly by the coherence time of the electron spin in the quantum dot. The maximum transmission distance (given by the speed of light) would be 10 m and 1 × 10 6 m for coherence times of 100 ns [18] and for 10 ms [19] in one-way transmission. We believe that the distance limitation will be lifted in the near future.
The decoherence is also a critical issue for an experimental realization of quantum information processing. In our case, the decoherence will eventually destroy the entanglement between the travel and home qubits. As a matter of fact, the decoherence effect and the Eve's attack are not distinguished in the security analysis in section 3. Any QKD protocol is limited by the total amount of decoherence due to the pure environment and due to attacks. In our case, the decoherence time of the home qubit is usually shorter than that of the travel qubit (photon), and hence the consideration in the previous paragraph sets the maximum transmission distance.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new QKD protocol exploring the quantum states of Faraday rotators. The protocol is secure against eavesdropping for an ideal single-photon source and robust against impersonation attacks. This protocol is not allowed for a multi-photon source which produces more than two photons. The protocol could be implemented experimentally with semiconductor quantum dots in a micro-cavity.
